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THE SITUATION OF THE CORPORATION MANAGE-
MENT IN JAPANESE CORPORATE SYSTEMt 
Kohgoro Y AMAGUCHI* 
Noboru TOZUKA** 
t This artic1e isa report delivered before l'Academie Internationale de Droit 
Compare VIII~me Gongr主sInternational， Pescara 6-13 septembre1970， under the title of 
“The organizational arrangements designed to assure continuity in corporate manage-
ment (I'organisation de Ia continuite dans Ia direction des societes)，" according 
to the note drawn up by M.A.F. Conard， Professor of the University of Michigan. 
We would describe and analyze the various devices which tend to 
protect， or uphold the stability of， the corporate bureaucracy or tech-
nocracy in J apanese legal systern. As noted by Professor Conard， the 
legal structure of private corporation (at least， of share cornpany) con-
forrns to a rnodel of par1iarnentary dernocracy. The shareholders are 
able to choose their “leaders" with cornplete freedorn to discharge the old 
rnanagers and elect new ones. Theoretically， these arrangernents rnight 
lead to frequent changes in rnanagernent responding sensitively to changes 
in the opinions of the electorate. But it is obvious that in reality the 
corporation rnanagernent are extrernely stable. It appears that a group 
of rnanagers， a kind of cornrnercial “o伍cercorps"， choose arnong thern-
selves those who are to be the leaders and those aspirants frorn outside 
who are to be adrnitted to the corps. 
This systern has been characterized as the corporate bureaucracy or 
technocracy: on the one hand the various rnechanicallegal devices exist 
as one rnay identify and on the other hand the rnanagernent rnay be insu-
lated by an “excess of dernocracy"-the corporation rnanagernent is pro-
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* Associate Professor of Commercial Law in the Univetsity of Osaka， Faculty of Laws， LL. 
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tected not by the size of its own holdings， but by the minuteness of 
everyone else's. The corporation management is assured of the continuity 
of corporate management of its own by various factors in the legal and 
social system. Generally speaking， the similar circumstances and condi-
tions are also found in Japan， but the functions of the legal devices and 
the social foundations on which the factors depend are somewhat different 
from those in other countries. 
1. In general 
1. Management and control of the stock corporation in Japan 
Under the stock corporation law in Japan before 1950， the organs of 
the corporation were composed of the general meeting of shareholders， the 
directors and the supervisor (Kansayaku). It took the former German 
stock corporation law as a pattern and espεcially placed major emphasis on 
the organizational unity of the corporation; i.e.， the reciprocal allocation 
of the corporate powers among its organs was accomplished under the 
principle of the omnipotence of the shareholders' meeting， which had the 
binding power on the directors on the one hand and on the other made 
the individual or minority shareholders almost absolutely submissive to 
the resolution under the princlple of majority rule. No means were 
general1y avai1able to respect the voices of the minority. As for the 
control， too， the supervisor had the supervisory power on the business 
management as well as the power of accounts auditing. Accordingly， 
the position of the directors was relatively inferior both to the share-
holders' meeting and the supervisor， and each individual director sepa-
rately composed the organ of the corporation; business conducts were to 
be decided only by their majority consent without the necessity of holding 
the meeting of directors， and each of the directors had the power to 
represent the corporation. These arrangements were wel1 harmonious 
with the economic conditiQns and circumstances of those days. Because， 
the economic system of J apan in those days was supported by the holding 
companies in which the financial cliques performed a dominant part， and 
3 
at least the big corporations raised their capital mainly by the functional 
shareholdings of the financial c1iques. 
However， these arrangements were changed by the ]apan's defeat 
in the W or1d War. I: the principal financial c1iques and the monopo1istic 
enterprises devided into pieces and al1 disappeared， and instead the eco-
nomic and social basis in which the laissez-faire principle prevails has 
been established. Hence， for the raising of the capital stock of the corpo・
rations there was no other way than to rely exc1usively upon the general 
public. Consequently， in 1950 the stock corporation law of ]apan was 
revised on a large scale， i.ム thedemocratization of the law was realized 
under the in自uenceof the Anglo-American laws of stock corporation. 
First1y， the powers of the General meeting are limited in such matters 
as provided for in the Act and other statutes or the artic1es of incor-
poration (Commercial Code， Art. 230・2)and the powers of the supervisor， 
henceforth as auditor， are restricted as wel1 to the auditing matters 
only (Com. Code， Art. 275). Secondly， corresponding to these arrange-
ments the institution of the board of directors as an organ of the corpo・
ration is to be established under the Act and to be conferred al the 
decision-making powers on the business conducts of the corporation 
(Com. Code， Art. 260). It Is provided in the Act that the each individual 
director is nothing but a member of the board of directors and that only 
and exc1usively the managing directors elected from the board's members 
represent the corporation (Com. Code， Art. 261). Although， needless to 
say， the board of directors is responsible for the control over the manage-
ment conducts executed by the managing directors， in addition to and 
paral1el with this function of the control the individual or minority share-
holders as investors of capital stock for the corporation have the rights 
and powers for and over the control in the light of paralyzing tendency 
of the shareholders' meeting. The rights and powers of individual or 
minority shareholders' over the control were increased and strengthened 
by the Act (Com. Code， Arts. 245-2， 267， 272， 280-10， 293-6 etc.) It is to 
say that thestock corporation law of ]apan is， inits fundamenta1 charac-
ter， linked together with the thought that the individuality of each share-
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holder should deserve more respect than the organizational unity of the 
corporatIOn. 
Apart from the institutions and systems of the corporation law， it
was considered necessary to protect the masses of the shareholders and 
investors in the securities transactions， and for that purpose the securities 
regulation law to regulate the issues and dealings of the corporate stock 
and other securities was enacted in 1948. With respect to the listed 
corporations and other stock corporations with their raised capital size 
exceeding the stated amount， their accounting should be auditted by the 
certified public accountant (C. P. A.) in order to protect public investors 
and to make public the exact financial conditions of the company (Se 
curities and Securities Exhange Act， Art. 193♂) 
2. Other particular conditions and circumstances in ]apaI1 
(1) Social conditions for the evolution of the management control 
Generally speaking， ]apanese labourers would serve for the company 
for life once hired， and thus their wage system and personnel administra-
tion are based on the seniority rule. The same is true even of the cor瞬
porate managers as well as the manual workers.ll Therefore， most of 
the corporate officers such as directors and auditors are so-called “inside 
o伍cers(directors and auditors) ". In particular， the fact that the cor-
porate directors are elected under the system of such a seniority rule is 
considerably inconsistent with the position of directors whom the stock 
corporation law of ]apan will treat as quasi-trustees for the shareholders 
as a whole and confer on them the real management power as the board 
member， and it also shows the symbolical fact that the management 
control has been realized in ]apan. It must be noted that the system such 
as the above-mentioned seniority system is attributed to a great extent to 
the national character of ]apanese people which clearly shows the closed 
character of their life environment and attitude cultivated under the 
1) A. Yamasiro (ed.)， Gendai no Keieirinen， Jittai.hen (The Ideology of the Modern Business 
Administration， Its Actual Conditions)， 1967， p. 173; K. Ogaka， Nihoπno Keiei (The 
Business Management in Japan)， 1969， p.9 suiv. 
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national isolation policy in the past history and tightly closed family 
system or feudal regime which tied the people with land under the agri-
cultural economy based on rice crop. These factors have even influenced 
the method of corporate management in the modern society of Japan: 
they have contributed to the establishment of the dictatorship in manage-
ment and， inaddition， have created the system of the disunion of respon-
sibility from power by way of the collectively participated management. 
But under such a method of management， the power and responsibility 
are split into the form and substance. In other words， the top manage-
ment who has in reality the substantial power assumes not the substantial 
but merely formal responsibility. Management control in Japan may 
have dangerous factors in the sense that there prevails the thought that 
the corporate property owned by shareholders in generallllay be treated 
as the manager's private property a1though it is “other people's money" 
(Brandeis)タ
(2) Actual and financial conditions of corporations in Japan 
Though there are now more than 780，000 stock corporations in Japan， 
the corporations whose stock is listed on the Securities Exchanges are at 
most 2，000 and most corporations are merely close or minor companies.3) 
Moreover， one giant corporation has several tens of subsidiaries or sub-
ordinate corporations which place several hundreds subcontracted corpo・
rations at their disposalY And many of such subcontracted corporations 
are under their exclusive control in order to secure the trade secrets. 
Such inter-corporate relations raise many problems producing， inter alia， 
the e妊ectthat these relations enlarge the management control: the 
managers of subsidiary or subordinate corporations are elected by their 
own shareholders， but their capital stock itself is always conditioned 
2) cf.， L.D. Brandeis， Other Peo戸le'sMoney and Ho即 theBankers Use Its， 1914. 
3) In 1968， the number of corporate enterprises was 780， 797， ofwhich 769， 623 were companies 
having capital less than ten million yen. The number of stock corporations with capital 
more than one thousand million yen respectiv巴lywas only 1，018. (The Census by the 
Ministry of Finance，.Kigyozaimu.Daiふka).
4) The Sin Nihon Seitetu Kabusikikaisha holds 450-500 affiliated corporations by capital 
participation. (24/1/1970， The Nihon Keizai Simbuπ). 
6 
under the business judgement of their parent or controlling corporations， 
and therefore the former is in fact always and widely bound or controlled 
by the latter management: Numerous subcontracted corporations are 
almost negligible “individual or partnership incorporated" (Kessler)戸
In Japan， the capital market is stil undeveloped and is characterized 
by the unbalanced situation of the system of the money rates: the nation-
al financial assets are absolutely small and the long-term interest is fixed 
in cheap money. Therefore， most enterprises are in the low condition of 
the owned capital ratio and obliged to rely on the loans from the financial 
institutions. Thus， the corporation management is devoted to assure the 
loans for the sake of stability of management. And it is necessary to 
forward the stable dividends， and in extreme cases the dividend out of 
capital by means of the embellishment of the accounts is not rare. Thus， 
in ]apan， ifthe stability of dividends is maintained， the shareholders 
do not interfere with the corporate management; the questions and 
answers on the approval of the accounts at the shareholders' meetings are 
almost always merely forma1. 
I. Various problems relating to the voting powers 
(1) Non-voting stock 
In the case in which a corporation has issued the c1assified share as 
regards the dividends preference shares the artic1es of incorporation may 
make them shares without voting powers， though this c1ass-shareholders' 
voting powers wi1 revive， ifthe stated preferred dividends could not 
actually be given. These arrangements are suitable for the investing 
shareholders who are indi百erentto the corporate management， sofar as 
the stable dividents are secured. But if this c1ass of shares might be 
issued unrestrictedly， itwill produce the bad result that the minority 
having the votingpowers controls the shareholders having no voting 
shares who have contributed the most part of the capital stock of the 
5) cf.， R.A. Kessler， '‘The Statutory Requirement of Board of Directors: A Corporate Ana. 
chronismぺ27Univ. of Chicago La加 Rev.，1960， pp.720 etc. 
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company. Therefore， the Act limits the number of non-voting shares to 
be issued at one quarter of al the issued share capital stock of the corpo開
ration (Com. Code， Art. 242). 
However， these arrangements are in fact almost of no uti1ty. Be-
cause， under the aforesaid dividends equalization policy， ordinary shares 
themselves would function as preference shares. Although it is advocated 
that the owned capital rate could easily be improved by means of the 
more frequent issue of preference shares， the issue itself in practice takes 
place only in some rare occasions. Thus， though a “thin incorporation" 
is also found in ]apan， the undercapitalized corporations in which the cor-
poration management holding the vast majority of the capital stock of the 
corporation controls the corporate property are very rare in the form of 
a thin incorporation by means of the c1assification of shares and their 
non-voting device. 
(2) Treasury stock device 
Under the ]apanese stock corporation law， a corporation can， as a 
rule， neither acquire its own shares nor take them in pledge (Com. Code， 
Art. 210)， and even in the cases of the lawful permission exceptionally 
granted， the corporation is prohibited to enjoy the voting powers on the 
shares (Com. Code， Art. 241， para. 2). However， in spite of this general 
prohibition， the corporation management usually evade the prohibition in 
order to their own stability through the fol1owing means. 
In the first place， as an ordinary means， the shares which the corpo幽
ration acquired in its account are held in the name of the security compa-
ny or the syndicate which purchased them on the corporation's instruction， 
or in the second place these shares since old days have been held in the 
name of the subsidiary corporation established for thatpurpose. In the 
the third place， the aforesaid shares are held by the foundation， institu-
tion and other auxiliary organizations of which fund has been supplied by 
the corporation. Last1y， the shares are held by the corporation's affiliated 
subsidiaries or their dependent corporationsア Moreover，the stock 
6) Y. Hirose， Kabusikikaisha-sihai no Kozδ(The Structure of the Corporate Control)， 1963， 
p.189 suiv. 
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sharing system in which the corporation lends the purchasing money to 
its employees has recent1y conspicuous， but its actual forms vary and not 
necessarily resu1t in the evasion of the law. 
(3) The stabilization of shareholdings 
The distribution of shareholdings in Japan after the war shows the 
tendency that the appreciable progress has been made in the so-called 
popularization of shareholdings. But， in its process up to date the 
percentage of shareholding by corporate shareholders has gradually and 
consistent1y been overwhelming the shareholdings by natural persons: 
whi1e the latter shareholders have been increasing in number up to 98 % 
of al the shareholders， the number of their shareholdings has been 
decreasing gradually from 69.14労in1949 to 41労atpresent7) and almost 
90% of them are the owners of less than 10，000 shares.8) Yet， inaddition 
to the fact that the corporation management have only 1.7労 ofal the 
shareholdings on an average， the corporation management of giant cor-
porations consist merely of the salaried executives. Thus， such salaried 
managers， for the purpose of securing their stability in Iilanagement， at-
tempt to advance the mutual shareholding both among the a伍liatedcor-
porations and with the other business corporations as customers and to 
promote the shareholding by the related banking and other finance cor-
porations. In. fact， the stability of shareholding is brought about by the 
mutual shareholdings of corporations and this tendency will be more and 
more strengthened in coping with the rising of the international tide of 
capitalliberalization in Japan. The corporation managment may assure 
the necessary shareholding for the management control through the 
stabilization of shareholdings. 
(4) Mu1tiple-voting shares device 
It has not been admitted as a legal device in Japanese legislation 
(Com. Code， Art. 241， para. 1) and is also interpreted as void contrary to 
7) Ibid.， p. 128. 
8) Osaka Stock Exchange， Kabusiki.bumpuzyokyo・tyosa(The Census on the Dispersion of 
Stock)， 1967， pp. 22， 24. 
ln Japan 50 yen par-value stock is common. 
the principle of equal treatment of al the shareholders. 
(5) Holding company device 
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Under the Japanese Anti-monopoly and Fair Trade Act， a holding 
company is defined as a corporation of which the main object consists in 
the control of other corporate business activities by means of holding the 
other corporations' share capital (Art. 9). The Act not only prohibits such 
a pure holding company， but also restricts the holding itself bya business 
corporation of the shares of other stock corporations either in the event 
of the substantial restraint of trade in a certain area of competition or by 
way of an unfair method of trade (Art. 10). And a finance corporation 
may not also hold the shares beyond 10% of the issued share capital stock 
of other corporation (ibid.). Other trade operations in the market are 
also in generallaid under the supervision of the Fair Trade Commission. 
However， with the advent of the perfect international freedom of capital 
and trade activities， and by the general recognition of the necessity for 
the strengthening the international competitive power of enterprises， the 
industrial rearrangement has been considered indispensable by means of 
the amalgamation and combination of corporations and the strengthening 
of managerial basis by way of the holding company device. The rear-
rangement aims at the prevention of the take-over of. the existing enter-
prises by foreign capitals， but at the same time it will be vulnerable to 
the management control. 
11. Problems of the general meeting of shareholders 
(1) The reduction of a quorum 
A quorum at a general meeting consists of the shareholders present 
who have the majority of the issued share capital (Com. Code， Art. 239). 
But it may be reduced， by the articles of incorporation， on the matters 
of the ordinary resolution .except for the election of directors， and such 
reduction of a quorum may contribute to the stability and maintenance of 
the management control. 
(2) Subject matters of resolution 
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Under the ]apanese stock corporation law of 1950 (Com. Code， Art. 
230-2)， the subject matters of the resolutions in the general meeting of 
shareholders become limited to those provided for in the statutes or the 
certificate of incorporation. It is natural that they are restricted by the 
certificate of incorporation to the basic and fundamental matters of the 
corporation itself at least in the cases of big corporations. However， since 
they contain the appointment and dismissal of the directors who may be 
invested the managerial powers in general， theoretical1y， the general 
meeting of shareholders is stil at present the supreme organ of the cor-
poration. But， inpractice， the supremacy of the general meeting which 
requires various necessary procedures for the resolutions may be mini-
mized or even lost. 
The subject matters which may be resolved in a particular general 
meeting are strictly restricted， infer alia， to those indicated in the notice 
of cal1ing the meeting and may not be added even by and at the general 
meeting itself. The agenda may not be altered， and only the modification 
of aparticular original bi1l may be permitted. The power of proposing 
bils is exc1usively attributed to the directors and individual shareholders' 
motion may be admitted only for the proceeding of meeting. For example， 
in case of nomination as wel1 as dismissal， the names of particular candi-
dates for directors are proposed， but they have already been decided by 
the directors. Thus， though the power of appointment of directors is in 
theory and law attributed to the general meeting of shareholders， in 
practice the power of decision as to who are to be proposed and when 
and how they are to be elected is whol1y vested in the hands of the di-
rectors in 0伍ce.And， infact， individual shareholders have no opportunity 
even to recommend or nominate their own candidates: it is usual that the 
bil passes in its original form drawn up by the directors unless there is 
any internal trouble or discord among the directors. The cumulative 
voting system which was introduced for the first time in the 1950 statute 
is not very effectively made use of because of the strict conditions imposed 
upon its operations (Com. Code.， Art. 256・3). In this sense， the power of 
appointment and dismissal of the corporation management ordinarily 
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consist in the hands of their own， not in the hands of shareholders in 
general. 
In addition， the general meeting of shareholde1's does not exe1'CIse 
even in law any effective cont1'ol avai1able to them over the managing 
di1'ecto1's. As the top management they play the pivotal 1'01 in the 
management of the co1'po1'ation. In pa1'ticula1'， the executive president， 
as the executive head on whom the manage1'ial powe1's are concentrated 
in big business， isof an almost omnipotent position. But he is elected 
among the directors by the board of directors， not by the general meeting 
of shareholders and yet the directo1's themselves are in fact nominated 
by the executive president. Thus， the general meeting cannot deprかea
director of the capaCIty of his being a managing director unless the 
gene1'al meeting denies his position as a director. Such a procedure ap-
pears almost impossible to be carried out. Consεquently， the fact that the 
general meeting has no control over the managing directors secures in 
effect the almost perfect stabi1zation of the position of the corporation 
立lanageロlent.
(3) A vai1abi1ty of proxy system 
As the resu1t of the stabi1zation of shareholding devices as mentioned 
in Chapter H， Section (2)， the fact that the high ranked large shareholders 
consist of the corporate shareholders is considered appropriate to main-
tain the corporate control in every company. Such large shareholders， 
so far as there is no gross mismanagement and at least reasonable divi-
dends are secured， usually submit their proxies in blank on their voting 
powers to the voluntary dispositions of the corporation management. 
Therefore， inmost cases， itamounts to the same thing that the corpora-
tion management previously gained the majority approval at the general 
meeting of shareholders. Consequenly， the general meeting is nothing 
but a ceremony rather than a forum of substantial discussions on the 
subject matters of the meeting. Paradoxically speaking， the general 
meeting is usually like a comedy from the viewpoint of the interests of 
the minor or ordinary shareholders.9l In addition to this， so-called meeting-
monogers who possess only a few shares of the corporation usuallyassist 
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the corporate managers in the proceeding of the meeting and in fact 
prevent the minor or ordinary shareholders from making burdensome 
questions. And the ordinary shareholders seldom present themselves at 
the general meeting and usually submit their proxies in blank to the 
corporatlOn紅lanagement.
On the other hand， inthe case of the corporation with listed stock， 
the proxy in blank and especially its canvassing is subject to the regula-
tions of the securities law (Securities and Securities Exchange Act， Art. 
194). A canvasser must send to the each shareholders the printed 
form， inwhich they may clarify their ayes or nays on the notified subject 
matters of resolution at the general meeting， together with the reference 
documents disclosing the informations about the matters. But these 
printed formsare usually returned to the corporation without clarification 
of the ayes or nays， and even if there is the clarification， itis interpreted 
that the effect of the resolution disregarding the clarification should not 
be a妊ected. Moreover， the expenses of the canvassing must always be 
borne by the canvasser， iム whereaswhen the corporation management 
serves as the canvasser the corporation itself bears its expenses， an out-
sider serving as a canvasser cannot claim indemnity for the expenses to 
the corporation. Consequent1y， the corporation management holds the 
advantageous position in proxy conflicts. In addition， the corporation 
management usually nominates its subordinates as the proxy agents. 
(4) Voting trust and voting agreement devices 
Nothing is provided for as to these devices in Japanese stock corpo-
ration law. .It wi1 be probably interpreted that the voting trust may be 
the object of the trusts while the voting agreement is null and void con-
cerning the effect of the resolution. But， inpractice， these devices are 
hardly avai1ed of. 
9) According to the census in June of 1966， the time required of the general meeting is almost 
always (at least in majority) within twenty minutes. The meeting which spent more than 
an hour are only 1 %. Syozihomu Kenky品(CommercialLaw Review)， No.393， 1966， p.38. 
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IV. Various problems relating to the management 
(1) The power of share al1ocation of the board of directors 
Under the authorized capital stock system introduced into Japanese 
stock corporation law in 1950 from the Anglo-American Law， the board 
of directors has， asa rule， the power of issuing the authorized shares of 
stock of the corporation. The grant of the preemptive right to the share-
holders or the third persons exc1usively depends on the discrection of the 
directors， but in the case of the issue of new shares to the third persons 
at a price favourable to them， itis subject to the approval of the general 
meeting of shareholders by the special resolutIon about the numbers， the 
c1asses， the discrimination of shares with or without par-value and the 
minimum issued price， and， inaddition， the board of directors is obliged 
to make a disc10sure at this shareholders' meeting the reason for the 
necessity of issuing these shares (Com. Code， Arts. 280・2suiv.). Conse-
quent1y， subject to the only restrictions in those cases， the corporation 
management has the initiative as to the maintenance and strengthening 
of . the corporate contro1. 
(2) The obligations in the stock dealings 
Under the present Japanese Securities and Securities Exchange Act 
(Art. 18) the listed corporations as issuers must draw up and notify the 
securities report to the Minister of Finance， but for its false or misleading 
statement only the publishing corporation itself shall be liable and the cor幽
porate 0自cersas the subscribers of the report have not been responsible， 
and even the certified public accountants or the underwriting companies， 
by whom the guarantee for the fairness and accuracy of its report should 
be brought， have been treated as exempt from any liability. Although a 
recent amendment wi1 improve on these points (Arts. 21， 22 of the revised 
Act in 1971)， as are generally pointed out and criticized， many evils are 
present through the fraudulent acts of the corporate 0伍cersin drawing 
up its report. Theoretically， on the other hand， the directors and auditors 
publishing and circulating the prospectus and the accounts are liable for 
the same acts under the stock corporation law of ]apan (Com. Code， Arts. 
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266-3， 280). In practice， however， since the burden of proof is imposed 
on the investers su百eringfrom the damages the su伍cientremedy is not 
necessarily available to them. 
(3) The existence of the system of “ringi (approval by document)" 
There exist in J apan the so-called “ringi" system， a customary 
dicision-making method of the enterprise.10l Under this system， the draft 
documents concerning programs and decisions of the enterprise are to 
be made by subordinates and then read and passed on among the members 
concerned of the executive and finally submitted to the executive head 
for the approva1. Its features or chara:cteristics consist in that: (1) they 
wi1 be made up by the rank and file in a terminal organization without 
the decision-making power and leadership: (2) they wi1 be examined 
individually and separately without the deliberation at the meeting of the 
department relative to their contents: (3) the executive president having 
the legal power and authority of decision wi1l normally approve them as 
they are without any a1teration. 
The “ringi" system has resu1ted from the traditional paternalism in 
the management of enterprises based on the system of employment for 
life and the seniority rule. It wi1 remain the underlying factor of Japa-
nese enterprises and will continue to survive in the future. Nevertheless， 
under the policy of democratization and rationalization of the principles 
of management such developments have taken place as the reformation 
of management organization by means of the stabilization of business 
management e妊ectedas the resu1t of the legal recognition of system of 
board of directors which should be composed of expert managers， the 
strengthening of functions of top management， the equipment of staff 
distinct from line system， and the distribution of independent powers 
and duties to each department of enterprises. On contrary， the 
“ringi" system in fact impairs the business e缶ciencythrough its long 
10) A. Yamぉiro(ed.)， Ringi・tekiKeiei to Ringi・seido(The Management under the Ringi-
syst巴m)，1966， p.25 suiv.; K. Tsuji， “Niho立 ni okeru Seisaku Kettei-katei-Ringi明記 ni
kanren site-(The Policy-making Process in Japan -Matters concerned with the Ringi-
system-)"， Sisd， No.487， 1960， p.28. 
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process to reach the decision and disperses the sense of responsibility 
among many 0伍cersand 0自cialsconcerned. In other words， while the 
top management who has the substantial power and authority is not in 
fact liable for the corporate management， the subordinates who only have 
the formal initiatives are made in reality to take partial charge of the cor-
porate enterprise. Thus the corporate management under the “ringi" 
system may bring about the dispersion of the responsibility from the cor-
poration management into the subordinates in general， may further the 
dictatorship of the top management through the pater'nalism in corporate 
enterprise， and may enable to assure. the stabi1ity of controlling and 
manegerial powers of the corporation management. 
(4) The reality of so-called “inside directors" 
In ]apanese practice， the overwhelming majority of the corporate 
directors and auditors are chosen among the native-born employees of the 
corporation by the recommendation of the executives under the systern 
of seniority rule， except only in the case of the delegates from the parent 
corporation or the creditors against the corporation. In addition to this 
practice， in law and in fact， the directors may at once lawfully hold the 
position both of employees and of director of the corporation. These 
directors qua employees are subject and subordinate to the direction of 
the executive president. It is therefore irnpossible to expect that these 
directors have the same independent and equal position as that of the 
executive head. And the board of directors are governed by the executive 
president and other managing directors with almost absolute control1ing 
leadership. More fundamentally， under the aforesaid “ringi" system it is 
not required for those directors-ernployees to have the qualities of an 
expert manager in charge of the entire enterprise， but the adrninistrative 
quality which is merely required for the conduct of the departrnent in 
charge. 
The same is true of the auditors who in law should be in charge of 
the control over the corporate accounts but in fact they are alrnost always 
subject to and dependent on the managing directors， and it is impossible 
to expect them to control the accounts independently of the corporation 
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management. What is more important， the outside control over the cor-
porate accounts by the certified pubic accountants who have to protect 
the investors in general public is also a百ectedby the interference of the 
corporation management. The certified public accountants are in fact 
and in law selected and appointed by the executive president and other 
managing directors and are unable to perform their genuine duty without 
the aids and col1aboration of the auditors. Consequent1y， the revision of 
the law is now under consideration to secure the true and fair accounts 
control and their independency and integrity. 
The corporation management would try with might and main to 
maintain the averaging of devidends even by means of the embe1lishment 
of corporate accounts. Because， the shareholders at the general meeting 
may almost be silent so far as the reasonable dividends are given. More-
over， the financial conditions of the corporation depend upon w'hether or 
not it can continue to retain the confidence of the bankers. 
(5) Depreciation of the owned capital ratio 
In Japanese enterprises the ratio of the owned capital versus the 
the gross assets of a corporation was depreciated into about 21 % (12.5% 
for paid-in capital) in 1967; 5.5% of the borrowed capital (about 79% of 
the gross assets) is composed of the loan capital (debentures or bonds). 
As for the borrowed capital， the loan on a long term is 17.5% and the bils 
payable or debts is 21.396 and the loan on a short term is 17.3%.1) The 
1imit of the amount of the borrowed capital is fixed only with respect to 
the debentures or bonds; the total amounts of debentures or bonds shal1 
not exceed the total sum of the paid-in and reserved capitals， and if the 
existing net assets of the company as shown in the last balance sheet 
is less than the aforesaid amount， itshall not exceed the sum of such net 
assets (Com. Code， Art. 297). Under the tax system in Japan， the loan 
interests are more advantageous than the dividends on shares， and gene-
rally the national financial asets themselves are few and also the invest 
ment companies have not su伍cient1ygrown up. Thus the insu伍ciencyof 
11) Mitsubishi Keizai-Kenkyusyo， '‘Kigyd-keiei no Bunseki， Syd叩 a43 Nen， Zyo (The Analyses 
on Business Management， 1968， Previous Term)"， 1968， pp. 10， 11. 
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development in the capital market has caused the sti妊nessin the system 
of money rates under which the cal rates are higher than the long term 
interests. The most of the debentures or bonds are subscribed by the 
banking and other finance corporations. Therefore， they are considered 
in substance as the metamorphosis of the bankers' long term loans戸〉
The depreciation of the owned capital ratio signifies that the number 
of voting rights on shares necessary for the corporate control can abso-
lutely be small for the corporation management， and in addition the heavy 
dependance on the banking loans makes the corporation management 
attach great importance to the voices of the banker-creditors. Thus the 
corporate management is apt to be restrained in their activities for the 
benefits of the shareholders as a whole. 
12) Only 10% of the industrials (except electlic business corporations) is subscribed by 
individuals， but the majority (about 60%) is undertaken by the banking coporations. The 
amount of iinancial assets held by individuals is absolutely small and their employment 
almost (about80%) composes the “inidirect iinancial assets" and in particular most deposits 
of the individuals consist of those in th巴負nancecorporations (30/5/1969， The Nihon Kiezai 
Simbun). 
